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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TUCKER RE.ALTY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent~
No.

vs.

10066

L. DOYLE NUNLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST.A.TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a sum of money claimed to be
due and owing to the plaintiff on a promissory note for
a real estate commission, which amount the defendant
claims was paid in full by the painting of the plaintiff's
duplex by the defendant, as a painting contractor.

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
A default judgment was entered against the defendant for failure to comply with the pre-trial order
and the defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and an
order remanding the case for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pre-trial order provides among other things
that:
"The defendant is directed within 10 days
from the date hereof, to furnish all the items that
he has available, contained in the motion of the
plaintiff filed herein on the 9th day of January,
1963.
"In the event that the defendant has said documents and fails to supply the same within the
10-day period, judgment will be granted in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, together with additional attorney fees."
The motion of January 9th, 1963 referred to was
supported by an order of Court dated March 5th, 1963.
(R. 25). This order was fully complied with. On the
12th day of March, the defendant appeared before the
plaintiff's attorney and explained that he was unable
to find any of the things demanded. ( R. 27) . Excep-
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ticm. however, was taken by the plaintiff and on the
tHth day of ~larch, 1963, the motion of the plaintiff
sc:cking conte1npt proceedings against the defendant
was heard. (R. 28-20). The motion was denied on the
18th day of June, 1963. (R. 30).
On the 19th day of June, 1963, a notice of readiness for trial was served and filed by the plaintiff certifying among other things:
"3. That such use of the rules of discovery as
counsel feels necessary for the trial of this cause
has been completed, and that the case is at issue."
After the entry of the pre-trial order of November
19th, 1963, the defendant made another search for the
records called for in the plaintiff's motion of January
9th. 1963, (T. 8) and found one only invoice formaterials used on the plaintiff's duplex, which the defendant. within the time allowed, delivered to the plaintiff.
(T. 3). This in turn, however, was not satisfactory to
the plaintiff and motion for a default judgment was
fully heard on the 19th day of December, 1963, wherein
it was disclosed (T. 6) that the defendant had in compliance with the pre-trial order furnished to the plaintiff all of the items that were available to him.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY
SHO,VS .A. FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
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From the evidence before the Court at the time of
the hearing of the plaintiff's motion for a default, it is
conclusively shown that the defendant made a search of
his records and that he gave to the plaintiff all of the
records that were available to him. (T. 3-5):
Q. And did you make a search to find those
records?

A. Yes.
Q. And what was the result of that search?

A. I found one record.
Q. What record was that?

A. This was a paint bill from Salt Lake Glass
& Paint Company.

Q. Do you know in substance approximately
what was the amount of the balance shown on
that particular invoice was?

A. It was around $35.00. I am not sure of the
amount exactly.
Q. Now what became of that invoice?
A. I received it from Salt Lake Glass, and I
took it to your office, and you asked me to deliver
it to Mr. Ryberg's office, which I did. He wasn't
there at the time and I left it with his secretary,
telling her this was the information or the records I have on that job.
Q. Did you leave it with his secretary?

A. Yes.
Q. Was that within the time provided by the
Pretrial Order in this case?

A. Yes.
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(~. :\ow in fad. ~lr. Nunley, does that invoice
contain all of the inforination that you have on
your records 'vith reference to the material that
~vas furnished on that job'?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know where the other-what
was the source of other materials used on that
job, if there were other materials used?
A. It was taken from our stock, the stock that
we haYe to work jobs with, which we buy in advance, a number of gallons, sometimes six months
in advance of this and use them up.

Q. Are you a general painting contractor?

A. Yes. . . .
Q. Now, do you know who did the labor on
that job?

A. Yes.
Q. Who?

A. ~Iyself and my son, James D., and my
brother, James Arthur Nunley.
Q. And you were unable to find any records
of that labor on your record?

.A. That is right.

POINT II.
THERE IS XO EY.IDENCE IN THE RECORD TH.A T THE DEFENDANT HAD ANY
OF TI-IE RECORDS SOUGHT, AT THE TilVIE
OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.
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The entire case of the plaintiff is built on the
answers of the defendant in his deposition taken on
the 27th day of November, 1962. On page 8 of his
deposition he is asked:
Q. Do you have copies of the invoices for paint
that went into this particular job.

A. I could get thein.
Q. Do you have them?

A. I don't have them with me.
Q. Do you have them in your constructive possession-in your records and files ?
A. Maybe; I am not sure of it. I may have
some of them. I am not sure I would have all
of them.
On page 9, with reference to the matter of labor,
he is asked:
Q. 'Vhat kind of records are these you keep?

A. Just in the life of the job on it, we keep
it. When that is through we destroy it; destroy
that. We have no need for these after that. We
know amount on what costs were; enter costs and
that is it.
Q. What do you mean "enter cost"; into
what?
A. In our book, what job cost us. We go over
our materials. This we know; what we have left
is profit.
Q. Did you keep such a record on this particular job?

A. Yes.
8
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Q. And you han: the record-

,\. Yes.
(~.

-still available 1

A. Yes.

On the I ~th day of March, I963, he is called upon
to produce these records and he is unable to find them.
On the 19th day of November, I963, he is ordered by
threat of default to make available to the plaintiff any
of the records tlm t he has and he does so.

POINT III.
THERE .ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL F.c\CT \VHICH TO OBTAIN SUBS'L\NTIAL JUSTICE BETWEEN THE PARTIES SHOlTLD BE HEARD.
From an examination of pages IO and II of the
defendant's deposition it appears that a certain job
would be done for the full payment and satisfaction
of the note sued upon.
Considering the facts most favorable to the defendant as we must do in cases of this kind; Frederick
~lay & Co., Inc. Y. Dunn, I3 U2 40, 368 P2 266; we
have a situation where the amount and cost of materials
and the amount of labor is immaterial. The plaintiff
says you do this job and I will cancel the note. The
defendant in consideration that he will have his note
fully paid does the job, and then the plaintiff, having
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received the benefits, disregards its agreement and
brings an action for the full amount of the note.
Q. Did you ever, at any time, on or about
May 20, make any estimate of the cost to the
Tucker Real Estate-what this job would be?

A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you tell him, at that time, that you
would only do it if .it was in full satisfaction. of
the note?
-

A. This was my understanding that I was.
(R. 10) .
POINT IV
IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFF TO DEFAULT THE
DEFENDANT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF
HAD CERTIFIED THAT ITS NEEDS FOR
THE RULES OF DISCOVERY HAD BEEN
COMPLETED.
On the 12th day of March, 1963, the plaintiff was
advised by the defendant that the defendant had none
of the documents or records requested by the plaintiff.
(R. 27). More than three months later, the plaintiff
certified in its notice of readiness that "use of the rules
of discovery ... had been completed."
CONCLUSION
The record shows that the plaintiff, which held the
defendant's note for $1,020.00, induced the defendant
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to paint the plaint iff's duplex inside and out with three
coats of' paint, including a double garage, with the understanding that by so doing the defendant would procure a full satisfaction of the note. Defendant's deposition was taken by the plaintiff and inquiry was made
in great detail into such matters as the cost of the paint,
and the amount and cost of the labor. Demand was
subsequently made for copies of the defendant's time
cards,\\'-~ Income Tax forms, withholding tax returns,
job books, etc., and though it has been felt by the
defendant and is respectfully submitted to the above
entitled Court, that this inquiry was into immaterial
matters, the real issue being was there a contract for
the painting of a duplex for the satisfaction of a note,
the defendant has conscientiously tried to provide the
information and has fully complied with the provisions
of the Court's pre-trail order. It is felt by the defendant
that the default judgment of December 27th, 1963,
here appealed from was entered by the Court by mistake. Certain it is that to obtain substantial justice
between the parties the judgment should be set aside
and the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Horace J. Knowlton
Attorney for Defendant
214 Tenth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
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